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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

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537 West 121st Street
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To provide a fellowship for mutual support and criticism among Christians who are profoundly concerned about the social problems of our time.

To encourage groups of Christians to act creatively and responsibly in their local communities as well as in national and international affairs.

To develop a core of common convictions and principles for the strengthening of the Christian social witness.

New ways to influence the churches and secular society in the direction of greater responsibility to all members of the community.

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CHRISTIANITY and SOCIETY

EDITORIALS

Not a Responsible Conservatism

In a recent issue we expressed the hope, though only a little faith, that the Eisenhower administration would prove to be an expression of a "responsible conservatism." In the three subsequent months this hope and faith has been well-nigh shattered. We need a responsible conservatism which would prove its maturity by gauging our responsibilities in the world with soberness and which would pursue domestic policy by not challenging the consensus, which the nation has reached on problems of justice, too severely. There are natural differences between the right and the left on various domestic issues. But if the differences are too wide, the unity and health of the nation is imperiled.

It now seems that, despite the obvious goodwill of the President, we are not to have a display of such a desired development. In foreign policy the President's knowledge of foreign affairs and his genuine commitment to a responsible foreign policy have not prevented the confusion existing in the Republican party on questions of foreign affairs from overwhelming the administration. The President's heart and mind are obviously right on these issues, but he has neither the courage nor the political shrewdness to counter the two types of irresponsibility represented by Taft on the one hand and McCarthy on the other. Our moral prestige has consequently sunk to a new low level in all parts of the world. It is difficult even for rigorous opponents of McCarthy in this country to understand the effect of "McCarthyism" on the world's opinion. It reinforces the established prejudices of Europe and Asia about our life, and persuades our allies that we are hysterical and stupid in our encounter with communism.

In domestic policy the raids on the public domain, begun with the tidelands bill and symbolized by Secretary McKay's attitude toward public power and the right of private enterprise to exploit natural resources belonging to us all, are not a sign of responsible conservatism. Neither is the dominance of the Jenners, McCarthys and Veldes in the field of investigation. There seem to be no end to these investigations, no scrupulous standards of fairness for their operation, and no limit to the demagogy which exploits the nation's fear of communism as a source of political advantage.

It is not pleasant to record that the business community behind this administration lacks the wisdom to establish a responsible conservatism. Our future would be brighter if there were some signs of such wisdom. For we are without doubt a commercial nation; and our business community is bound in the long run to achieve political power consonant with its position in the nation. Or can we hope for another alliance of farmers, workers and middle class people to challenge the supremacy of the business man?

Reinhold Niebuhr

Piety and Politics

The Eisenhower administration is very pious. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture—the latter a Mormon—are recognized religious leaders. The President, who was not known for his in-

terest in religion while he was president of a university, has been at some pains to express his religious faith. Nor can one be completely cynical about this development and attribute it to the well-known popularity of religious observance among politicians. The piety of the President, as illustrated, for instance, in his little prayer at his inauguration, seems to be an honest expression of a sensitive person facing great responsibilities and grasping for the ultimate sources of wisdom.

Nevertheless, the piety of the administration raises some old questions about the relation of piety and public rectitude. Perhaps it is just that one does not appreciate piety on the part of those with whose politics one does not agree. If that is the case, we might all be more careful in relating our political positions with our religious faith, lest we give offence to those who belong to our household of faith but do not agree with us politically. But beyond this scruple there is the fact that there is so little courage in the administration in resisting the demagogues who prey upon the people's fears and bring confusion into our life. Perhaps the point is that one respects piety when its obvious fruit is courage and integrity; and one has questions when piety is combined with caution and opportunism.

Reinhold Niebuhr

Let's Not Deny Too Much

The recent encounter between Senator McCarthy and the churches over the Matthews article provides a new revelation of the public and political strength of American Protestantism. The article is out, the churches growl ominously, the President intervenes, and J. B. Matthews is fired over McCarthy's protests—all within a week. And since that time, there has been a growing tendency for discerning men to draw their political skirts around them as McCarthy goes by. What looked like a magic political potion may turn into political poison. It is clear that the churches can defend themselves and look after their own. In that kind of cause they can deploy their strength with speed and employ it with skill and swift effect, whether it be in a somewhat phoney war like the Vatican-representative issue, or in a real fight against a real enemy such as the idolators of Americanism undoubtedly are.

Yet in rejecting the not-too-soft impeachment about Communism, we need to be careful that we don't deny too much. An "unwitting dupe" of the Communist Party means, in McCarthy-Matthews language, anyone who stands roughly to the political Left of Senator Taft (and it's not too clear that Taft escapes the label, in view of his judgment about Communist teachers). Bishop de Wolfe of Long Island is hardly off his ship from Europe before he is assuring the press that "90 per cent of his clergy are loyal", which in the Long Island sense of the term means that 90 per cent of his clergy are orthodox. It has the curious effect also of leaving 10 per cent of them under suspicion, which is a considerably higher percentage than even Matthews was gunning for.

If we are denying that Georgia Harkness and Bishop Oxnam are Communists, we are on firm ground. But if we are proposing to demonstrate that even 90 per cent of the clergy conform to the patterns of political orthodoxy cut for us by McCarthy and Matthews, then we are on very unsound ground indeed—I hope. There is a strong tradition of social criticism stemming out of the Social Gospel and its successors (and represented only too poorly by Christian Action) which is one of the more salutary elements in the Protestant churches. Matthews doesn't like it, but that is no reason for disavowing it. Some elements of social Christianity put too many eggs in the Soviet basket, and are slow to admit they were unfertile—but while that is a bad mark against their social prescience, it does not negate their social concern. I'll still take the deluded fellow-traveler with the red stars in his eyes, rather than the McCarthys of this world with the glint of fascist steel in theirs.

There's no question about the strength of Protestantism: the question is how that strength is to be used. Is it to be used solely for the defence of the Church itself, or for the defence of less central, but still crucial positions—for the fight, for example, against McCarthyism itself? Can the Church perform its proper and primary Commission and in addition provide inspiration and illumination for a fight on two fronts—against Communist idolatry on the one hand, and against the idolatrous Americanism for which Communism provides the occasion and excuse? We have the lesson of Hitler's Germany before our Christian eyes. The Church kept hands off the state until the ordinances of God were thrown down one by one, until the lineaments of the true state were no longer to be seen, and in its place was a bastard state that praised evil-doers and punished them that did well. The Church stirred when the state laid its hand on the people of Israel and sought to curb the liberty of prophesying. But by that time the outer defences were down and the Church had to defend the inner citadel with bare hands.

At the official level we do pretty well. The National Council has queried the investigative procedures and Bishop Sherrill is presently in close-quarters grappling with the Velde Committee. But the real issues will be fought out locally. The question is whether we can breed and sustain the kind of men and women who cherish freedom and will defend it in what William Blake called "the minute particulars": a hall for Paul Robeson, UNESCO in schools, the right of Communist and near-Communist teachers to be judged by their peers for scholarly competence and not by vigilantes for their association with what is still a legal party.

There is some encouragement in the perception that McCarthyism is not new; it is as old as the Palmer raids and older. But when it has been defeated before, it has been defeated by men who cared about "the minute particulars" of freedom—by the courage of a judge, the readiness of a crack lawyer to take an unpopular case, the willingness of a parson or a college president to stick his neck out.

The same kind of courage is being called for again in many a lonely place. It may be that we can help one another take this strain if we identify ourselves to one another through Christian Action.

Alexander Miller

Little Cause for Elation

At the announcement of the signing of the truce in Korea, President Eisenhower's sober and restrained message to the nation probably reflected the feelings of the majority of the American people. The news was greeted prayerfully and thankfully, but with little cause for elation. While some of our self-appointed "statesmen" and our super-patriotic commentators continue to agitate that we never should have ceased without total victory in a war that we never should have entered, most of our responsible spokesmen regard the news of armistice with a mixture of hope and apprehension.

There is real reason for hope. Three years of a costly and tedious war have seen the accomplishment of some very important objectives. First of all, the specific aggression was halted and repulsed. This was the primary aim of the UN when it came to the aid of South Korea. Secondly, the free world has proved to itself and to the Communist world that for the first time in history the principle of collective security has found an international agency that can muster military force to meet the aggression of military force. These achievements are less dramatic perhaps than total victory and unconditional surrender, but they are far more significant in the twentieth century world. These are real, albeit precarious, steps in the direction of world order and cooperative defense against the violation of peace.

Korea remains divided at the laying down of arms, and rightly so. The UN has resisted the temptation to adopt the reverse purposes of the aggressor. The criterion for

measuring the success of the police action was not the reunification of Korea. This is an objective to which we are committed, but which the UN has had the wisdom to insist must be achieved by political means. And therein lies another element of hope—that our best leadership has had the vision to make the effective resistance of military aggression and the restoration of the requisite conditions for a political settlement of the Korean problem the limited criteria for our action.

But our apprehensions are also justified. The most obvious reason for our suspicions and our fears is that we know we face a treacherous and subtle, as well as formidable, foe in the post-truce political talks—a foe with a remarkable genius for turning both fact and fiction to his political advantage. If we were unconvinced of this before, the Communist maneuvers during the truce talks should have helped to open our eyes. The last big and extremely costly push of Communist forces just before the signing of the armistice—a military move calculated purely to give the impression that we were on the run and anxious for a truce to save us from imminent military defeat—is clear evidence of the way in which the Communists are willing to pay the highest prices in their own blood for the sake of political advantage.

The Communists are undoubtedly fanatical—both in military conflict and in political machination. But they are not hysterically fanatical as the Nazi tyranny was. They are coldly "scientific" in their fanaticism and display an almost uncanny ability to choose the proper time for open and for restrained forms of harassment of their opponents. In view of the tremors of unrest in the Communist centers in Europe, we may count on the increased importance of Asia in the Communist strategies. The cessation of hostilities in Korea, therefore, seems well timed by the Communists to strengthen their hand elsewhere in Asia.

We are not only plagued by confusion in estimating the intentions of Moscow and Peiping and in anticipating their next moves and hence in calculating our own strategy, but we still show little evidence of being able adequately to understand and therefore to account for the emotional appeal that Communism continues to hold for many depressed and poverty stricken peoples—especially in the East. Many of these people can overlook the treacheries of Communism because they still can see only the treacheries of colonialism and exploitation which they attribute wholesale to "imperialistic capitalism." We are almost bound to underestimate this factor in the Cold War, because we have known some of the correctives in our own society (which are, incidentally, largely the heritage of the past twenty years) and relatively few of its more extreme inequities, and because the Communist appeal has almost disappeared in this country (McCarthy et al notwithstanding).

Faced with such an ominously shrewd and calculating opponent, we will probably continue to feel somewhat unsure of ourselves in the Cold War. Our problem is compounded by the fact that we do not share the "efficiency" of totalitarian decision-making. A veritable Babel of tongues vie for our attention as to how we are to assess and meet the challenge which confronts us. We must continue to reject the extremes of these mixed counsels—neither assuming that the Korean police action has been so much wasted motion nor believing that harmony will automatically flow from the armistice; neither precipitating full scale war nor recoiling and yielding too much.

Since it seems we may continue to expect long-range, piece-meal harassment at the hands of the Communists in an endurance test, even though an armistice has been arrived at in Korea, and since our own hysteria tends to force us alternately to exaggerate our hopes and then our fears; it becomes increasingly clear that we do face a moral and spiritual problem—albeit in different terms than our public and official piety attests. The crisis we confront is whether our roots are deep enough and

our spiritual foundations strong enough for us to comprehend "the breadth and length and height and depth" of life in our critical and complex times. The precarious position of power and responsibility into which we have been thrust and the unprecedented nature of the tyrannous evil with which we have to deal demand a profound dimension of depth in our culture if the self-destructive temptations into which our crisis lures us are to be mitigated. Only faith in the God before whom "the nations are as a drop in the bucket" can give us the humility to qualify our self-righteous temptations to over-use our power. Only faith in the God in whose sight "a thousand ages are as an evening gone" can give us the patience to qualify our premature temptations to "settle this once and for all." Only faith in the God whose moral purposes transcend, but do not annul the moral purposes of men, can give us the courage to "do the right as God gives us to see the right," and to qualify our temptations to despair. Only faith in the God of judgment and forgiveness, in the God of Christ, can give us "the peace which the world cannot give," the "peace which passeth understanding," to qualify our confusions and our sinful over-simplifications about the meaning of a just peace.

Korea stands as a symbol of the enduring, external threat of Communism and of the way in which the free world can meet this threat. There is very little immediate internal threat of Communism remaining in this country. The very serious and potentially tragic internal threat which we do confront is that we might not have the spiritual and moral resources to discern the nature of the internal and the external threats we face (their differences and their subtle similarities), and properly to assess our role both at home and abroad.

Robert A. Gessert

Food to East Germany

The Administration's quick move to send food to the Russian zone of Germany has met with widespread public acclaim in this country as a humanitarian move, and with rejection by Russia as unneeded and as a purely political move in the Cold War. Undoubtedly there is a partial truth both in the naivete which hails this move as purely humanitarian and in the cynicism which notes only its political nature.

The quick approval of the Administration's offer in the nation's higher councils is as much an indication of astuteness to political strategy as it is an indication of a response to a people's need. Other urgent needs for food have not touched the nation's heart in quite the same way. One is reminded, in particular, of the difficulty in getting approval for the previous Administration's grain for India proposal. That program appeared threatened by the reaction of some to the so-called "ingratitude" of India's leaders who were not willing to support America's interests in the UN proceedings at that time. Practically no one expects a change in Russia's attitude as a result of the present move. On the contrary, the Russian rejection of the offer was not only to be expected, but also desired. The political significance of this move lies exactly in the fact that "no strings" are attached. RIAS, the U. S. radio station in West Berlin aimed at East Germany, was ordered to put special emphasis on this point. The move is politically strategic just because it appears as motivated by humanitarian impulses which transcend political interests. Such a strategy is calculated to improve our stock (which is perilously low) in the world's public opinion while discrediting Russia who is unwilling to accept the gift, and to prove to the satellite nations that we are willing to "stand by" offering support short of physical intervention for their liberation. Thus, it also provides a welcome occasion for the new Administration to prove its intentions to make good on its campaign promise of a foreign policy which is "more than containment."

But the political implications of this act should not make us cynical about it. In

the first place, it is a wise political move, though we cannot now estimate its full significance. Secondly, the food, as it does get through to East Germany, should partially relieve a people who are doubtless hungry to the starving point. Most acts of human beneficence are doubly motivated to meet a real need and to enhance the position of the donor. If this is true of the acts of individual men, it is doubly true of the acts of nations. We may be grateful that human needs do not have to wait for "pure" motivations in order to be met, for the purposes of God transcend the purposes of men often through the acts of men.

Yet, we must be sensitive to the cynicism which is anxious to disclose the political motivation behind acts such as this, though we cannot agree that what claims to be a humanitarian move, simply because it is motivated primarily politically is *ipso facto* not to be supported. What we must be sensitive to is our own temptations of greater self-righteousness toward which our professions of purely humanitarian motivation inevitably lead us and which our foes and our cynics are not long in discovering. The claim of pure humanitarianism with "no strings" attached is a political strategy which is eventually self-defeating. It is a "string" on our propaganda harp which cannot be played too long or too hard, lest public reaction become the opposite of what we bargained for.

Robert A. Gessert

Protestant-Catholic Cooperation

It is regrettable that Protestant-Catholic relations are too often hampered by incidents such as the one reported elsewhere in this issue under the title, "The Planned Parenthood Episode in the New York Welfare and Health Council." The compilers of this report take heart in the fact that in this incident, resistance to the action of the Roman Catholic organizations was "rendered effective without bigotry and without animus."

It is relatively clear that the most flagrant instances of Protestant-Roman Catholic antagonisms, which are all too common in our society, may justly be classified as examples of the ministries of hate and disruption (to borrow terminology from Ralph L. Roy) within both folds. In his remarkable book, *Apostles of Discord,* Mr. Roy has given us ample and disturbing documentation about the activities of the various fringe groups within Protestantism which make use of and help to mold racial, political, national and religious prejudices —particularly anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic sentiments (cf. Chapter 7, entitled " 'No Popery'!—Bigotry's Battle Cry"). It might prove interesting to see a similar analysis of anti-Protestant movements on the fringe of Catholicism.

Most of the responsible leaders in both the Catholic and the Protestant Churches, however, are more concerned to foster cordial relations between the two communions, than to further or capitalize on disruption or hate. For this we may be extremely grateful. Undoubtedly, we still have a good deal to learn from each other —even in the very ticklish area of the relation of Christianity to society. Mutual respect and fairness on both sides are necessary ingredients for a more fruitful interchange.

But at the same time we must be clear that there are real and important differences in Protestant and Roman political theories as well as in doctrine. We Protestants should probably confess that we have too often overstressed and confused these differences. The furor in our churches over the recent proposal to send a United States Ambassador to the Vatican and over the discussion of possible forms of public aid to Parochial school children may be a case in point. But, of our Catholic friends we would ask further consideration of their grounds for noncooperation in community enterprises such as the Welfare and Health Council of New York. The reported episode seems to many of us as an example of strained Protestant-Catholic relations of a responsible nature which can best be healed

from the Catholic side. Commenting on this type of incident in an article entitled "A Protestant Looks at Catholics," in the outstanding Catholic journal, *Commonweal,* May 8, 1953, Dr. Niebuhr observed:

"The prohibition of birth control becomes a problem among us when Bishops threaten long-established 'Community Chest' forms of communal cooperation because one of the charities included in the Chest may happen to harbor a birth-control clinic. The prohibition of contraception is regarded by some of us as an illustration of the fact that the Christian abhorrence of naturalism does not prevent 'Natural Law' theories in this instance from sinking to a naturalistic dimension. Nothing is more obvious than the assertion that 'nature' intends the end of procreation in sexual relations; but we believe also that the freedom of the human person rises indeterminately above the primary ends of nature. We believe that the temptation to abuse the new freedom which contraception makes possible is in no different category than the temptations and abuses in the whole of modern technical civilization."

Robert A. Gessert

"This role of leadership is new to us. By and large the United States lived alone—and liked it—so long as this was possible, and somewhat longer than it was desirable. Until the last few years our entrances onto the world's political stage had been largely limited to moments of great crisis . . .

". . . it has become impossible for us to be merely an occasional participant in world affairs. Without our full-time participation, no coalition of free nations could be built which would be strong enough to deal with the Soviet threat.

"Now I note a strange and disquieting aspect of this change to many people. Our past experience gave us Americans a somewhat exaggerated notion of the effectiveness of our power. We felt that victory was assured once we made up our minds—and indeed military victory in the immediate battle was assured. But many of us drew the conclusion that any cause that had our support was automatically assured of quick success. And this was not necessarily or even probably so, if the real cause, the real purpose, was not military victory but peace.

"For peace cannot be won as a war is won. Peace in the world, like good government at home, is a goal we approach but never finally or perfectly attain. Peace, like religion and the good life, is the task of each new day; it must be worked at in little things and in big things so long as breath we draw."

—Adlai E. Stevenson
New York City, October 21, 1952

Academic Freedom and Integrity

Bernard M. Loomer

During the academic year just completed one of our students wrote an article for an extreme rightest national student magazine. In this article he portrayed the University of Chicago as a leftist institution pretty thoroughly dominated by faculty and students who are very sympathetic to communism and its policies. In his judgment a considerable portion of the University is un-American in its outlook such that rightest or patriotic viewpoints and students do not have an equal opportunity for a hearing. This article was reprinted essentially in the University student weekly newspaper.

This reprinted article of course gave rise to a furor in the University student body. Numerous letters of protest from students were written to the University newspaper. The flurry on the whole was brief in duration but strong in intensity. The attitude of the University administration was well expressed in a trenchant letter from the Universtiy Dean of Students to the student who had written the original article. It said, in part: "I suggest that the wisdom and tolerance of the University are demonstrated by your unquestioned freedom to present so dubious an analysis without jeopardy to your status as a student." The student newspaper editorialized to the effect that the article as a whole was irresponsible and considered the incident closed.

Shortly after this whole affair, this particular student petitioned the Theological Faculty of the University for admission to candidacy for his degree. With one exception all members of the appropriate Theological Faculty committee had read the reprinted article. Many of them of course had encountered this student in other contexts. On the basis of its previous acquaintance with the student and its reading of this article, the committee felt that the student had evidenced the kind of mind and outlook it could not condone or put its stamp of approval on.

With respect to the writing of a public article on an important subject, the committee agreed that the student had not exemplified the proper regard for evidence, premises and conclusions that he would be required to demonstrate in classroom work. The committee also felt that he seemed to be somewhat impervious to other interpretations and viewpoints, and appeared to assume little, if any, initiative in determining what the facts in the situation were. In the opinion of the faculty, the "sources" used by the student were highly questionable. In short, the committee concluded that this student did not possess a sufficient amount of personal integrity and freedom to warrant its recommending him to a position of religious leadership.

After long deliberation on the case (including the problem of the practical wisdom of coming to a negative decision on a matter of this kind and at a time like this), the committee decided unanimously to defer action on the student's petition for admission to candidacy. This decision was communicated in writing to the student and his attention was called to the following paragraph contained in our catalogue: "The scholastic qualifications for any degree are enumerated under the appropriate degree heading. The student's recommendability for a position of religious leadership is a necessary prerequisite to his candidacy for any degree. Such recommendability is based upon the judgment of the faculty with respect to the student's moral and personal integrity as well as his intellectual ability." (Strictly speaking, there was another element of the committee's decision which involved the stu-

dent's giving further evidence of his ability to do satisfactory work in his field of specialization. But this aspect of the case need not detain us here.)

Since this student had many contacts with various rightest or "patriotic" groups outside the University, the faculty's action was immediately branded as being politically inspired and as a denial of academic freedom. Some students within the University had questions on this point. The purpose of the present article is neither to protect the faculty against this kind of clamor from pressure groups outside the University nor to validate the faculty's decision in this particular instance. (In subsequent discussions with this student the faculty has been more than satisfied with the validity of its analysis of the student and the wisdom of its action.) My purpose is to set forth the grounds of the faculty's action as they bear on the discussion of academic freedom. The primary orientation of this article lies in the direction of the problem of academic freedom for students, at least at the graduate level. But in my judgment it has implications for faculties (as well as for undergraduates).

I

The theological faculty believes in freedom, academic and otherwise. It is an important and primary value. But academic freedom, as usually defined, is not an absolute value existing in proud isolation and needing nothing but itself in order to exist. The meaning and the validity of the concept of freedom are determined in part by its relations to other fundamental ideas. One such idea is "integrity" as we of the faculty define it and try to require its embodiment in faculty and students alike.

Integrity, as this term is usually defined in university circles, means honesty or sincerity. The theological faculty's use of the concept includes the connotation of honesty but it also involves other dimensions. It connotes, in the first place, the idea of wholeness or unity. We feel that a student ought to try to weld together the several disciplines that constitute his academic work. We think that he should attempt to achieve a sense of wholeness whereby each aspect of his experience partly determines and modifies the meaning of every other facet of his experience. We are interested in his development toward one world of inter-related meanings, an integrating world-view. This demand arises from the fact that the student is one person. We are concerned that he not be a conglomeration of separate, compartmentalized or unrelated selves. In this respect and to this degree all graduate work should have a philosophical or theological concern as an inherent part of its aim. Without this concern, specialized work loses its sense of perspective and proportion.

A corollary to this understanding of wholeness as a dimension of integrity would include some correlation between a student's ideas and his emotions. This notion means more than the process of overcoming that condition wherein a student believes one proposition with his mind and a contradictory or contrary proposition with his emotions. It rather has reference to that situation where a student's ideas and his whole intellectual life are rooted within the matrix of his fundamental human feelings and reactions to himself and his world. And, conversely, his basic feelings and emotions should support and nurture his ideas. In this type of educational development a student's intellectual life becomes bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh; his affective responses and outreachings are sharpened, structured and made more sensitive by virtue of being qualified and informed by his intellectual growth. In this manner the "works of the mind" assume a deeper and more permanent role in his every-day life.

If these relationships are not real elements in a student's life, as I am inclined to think they are not in most undergraduate and graduate work, then the universities are engaged in the business of educating specialists who will shortly become anti-

intellectuals. In this sense I think that much of our so-called educational work is a process whereby we de-humanize and de-personalize the student.

The second dimension of integrity consists of the idea of ragged and growing edges in our wholeness. This indicates that the student needs a reasonably open and flexible mind. It involves his trying to synthesize ever wider and deeper reaches of human experience. In one sense we are not so much concerned with the student's achievement of integrity as we are with his progress toward integrity. We would define a "completed integrity" as a contradiction in terms. The process toward integrity should illustrate the Protestant principle that all of life is subject to the judgment and grace of God, that everything finite and human is subject to criticism—even the integrity the student has achieved at any particular time. Thus there is not only incompleteness but also judgment.

Consequently in terms of our understanding of integrity as a valid educational goal, we believe that the student should attempt to realize a reasonable degree of self-knowledge or self-consciousness. In this process he becomes aware of the direction of his growth and movement such that he is reasonably cognizant of where he has come from and of what he is moving toward. He becomes sensitive to his strengths and weaknesses, his biases and prejudices, his blockages and obsessions, his uncriticized assumptions and blind spots, his idolatries. He understands this process of movement well enough to trust it with some degree of assurance. He has lived in this kind of situation long enough such that he is to a considerable extent at home in it.

This discussion of the meaning of integrity as we use the term can be summarized by saying that the movement toward integrity is a movement toward personal or internal freedom. As a faculty we are not inclined to deny either in theory or in practice the legal and academic right of freedom of speech. But also as a faculty with the University we are concerned with the question as to whether the sudent is free enough inside himself to be able to encounter and absorb criticism. "Personal freedom" means that the student should be increasingly free and mature to accept the consequences (including adverse judgments) of his freedom of thought, speech and action. This implies that he would really listen to other ideas, that he would encounter other viewpoints without feeling that he was being threatened.

In the case of this particular student the faculty was agreed that he had integrity in the sense of honesty and sincerity. We were convinced that he acted in terms of his convictions. But we felt that he lacked a sufficient amount of integrity in the deeper sense because his interpretation was not open to further light and criticism. His personal freedom was so severely restricted that his competence was seriously jeopardized. His sense of discrimination and judgment was impaired.

II

It is universally understood that a faculty should and does evaluate a student's competence, his knowledge, either specialized or generalized. It is assumed that this is the primary business of a faculty. It is not so widely acknowledged that a faculty should evaluate a student's integrity. A student is free to think and act as he pleases (within the laws of the state, of course), to adopt any economic, political, or theological position he chooses. But I would contend that we as a faculty are free and in fact obligated to evaluate his actions and viewpoints in terms of our best insights and criteria with respect to the student's movement toward greater integrity or personal freedom. It follows that the faculty, in adversely evaluating a student's integrity and personal freedom, should offer the student not only judgment but forgiveness. The degree of the student's realization of integrity and freedom would be measured at least in part by his willingness to accept and absorb judgment and forgiveness. Thus at least in my own mind a concern for integrity neces-

sarily involves the elements of judgment and forgiveness. In fact these three concepts are internally related. Or, to put the matter in a slightly different manner, the notion of internal personal freedom is practically meaningless apart from the factors of judgment and forgiveness.

University faculties today tend on the whole to ignore the problem of integrity, as I have outlined its meaning, both at the faculty and student level. But it does not make sense to say that a faculty must condone anything a student chooses to do in this area of integrity. If, out of what I think would be a misguided devotion to academic freedom, a faculty is to make no adverse judgments (or no judgments at all) on cases similar to that of this particular student, then it seems to me that we are indeed in a serious position. To adopt this viewpoint would mean (and often does in fact mean) that academic freedom is synonymous with tolerance in the worst sense, in the sense that all criteria are equally good or equally bad. The failure to make evaluations with respect to integrity weakens the reality and the power of freedom, both academic and personal. No faculty that seriously believes in freedom can or should adopt a principle or a practice that ultimately denies true freedom. The deeper dimensions of freedom involve the elements of judgment and forgiveness and thereby transcend the usual meaning of tolerance.

The position I have outlined has its risks. Ultimately it requires sensitivities and niceties of discrimination that are beyond human possession in terms of their fullest realization. Nevertheless, we feel that judgments must be made and forgiveness extended, whether or not the forgiveness is accepted. But we make these judgments and extend this forgiveness as sinners, standing under judgment and needing forgiveness ourselves.

To be sure, none of us likes to make adverse judgments because in this role we seem to be playing the part of God. But the making of an affirmative judgment with respect to a student's integrity is just as presumptuous. The ultimate difference between the two types of judgment is that an affirmative decision is psychologically easier to handle. An attitude of indifference toward this issue is also an instance (albeit hidden) of "playing God."

This approach and this understanding will appear to some people to qualify the theory and practice of academic freedom, particularly if the student happens to advocate a cause that is not popular in a certain community (as in the case of the student mentioned). Judgments are fallible, self-interests are involved, as misinterpretations will occur. These are risks that a faculty must assume.

Incidentally, perhaps it is unnecessary to point out that the position of the theological faculty in the case of this particular student is not contradictory to that of the dean of students whom I quoted. The student's status was not jeopardized. He was in no way cut off from resources within the curriculum and within the faculty whereby his development toward integrity or personal freedom (as well as competence) might be furthered.

III

I have suggested that academic freedom is a dimension of academic life that should be interpreted in the fuller context of a movement toward integrity which in turn is a movement toward greater personal freedom. In making this suggestion I am aware that academic freedom in the usual sense is being subjected to great criticism today by all kinds of rightist forces. I think this condition in our national life is serious. But the condition of our universities is much more grave if one looks at academic life in terms of a concern for actual internal personal freedom as exemplified by students and faculty alike. I would hold that the discussion of academic freedom is being carried on in a secular and very "thin" context. Academic freedom, to my mind, needs to be interpreted in terms of the fuller dimensions of the nature of man

himself. I think it is quite possible and likely that we will try to maintain academic freedom without exemplifying a concern for the human and divine roots of academic freedom within the life of the individual student and scholar. In this way we may in truth kill off the actuality of academic freedom by an insensitivity to the more deeply personal and spiritual dimensions of freedom. Because of this truncated approach we are not as well equipped as we should be to handle the attacks of the Veldes, the Jenners and the McCarthys.

The position I have outlined has implications for determining criteria for membership on a university faculty. At the present time individuals are appointed to university faculties if they are competent in some area of specialized study and if they have integrity (i.e., if they are honest, sincere, and morally respectable). These individual faculty members possess, to a greater or less extent, academic freedom, including freedom of inquiry. A more adequate set of criteria would not only assure freedom of inquiry for all faculty members; it would require that every member of the faculty should be vigorous in his support of freedom of inquiry for all of his colleagues in all departments of the university, regardless of whether this might result in his own economic, political, or religious ideas being threatened. These criteria would also include not only adequate competence in specialized knowledge but also an active concern for the dimensions of integrity as I have outlined them. This concern for integrity would not be the luxury or the addendum that it now appears to be.

These fuller criteria for faculty membership should be present in the discussion of the question as to whether Communists should be members of university faculties. Communists would be judged in terms of their individual cases. If they embody the dimensions of integrity or personal internal freedom, and if they are competent, they could be appointed. If not, then they have eliminated themselves from serious consideration and they would not be appointed. (One exception to this general rule might occur, although not in these days of crisis. A university faculty or administration might think it advisable to have a small minority of totalitarian representatives on the faculty in order to insure sympathetic and adequate interpretations of those viewpoints. This action could be justified on some grounds.) One not insignificant advantage that might accrue from adopting these criteria would consist of our becoming less defensive in the present situation.

Among Those Present

● *John C. Bennett* is Professor of Christian Ethics and Theology at Union Theological Seminary. ● *Stephen T. Crary* is Chaplain and Assistant Professor of Religion and Biblical Literature at Smith College. ● *A. Roy Eckardt* is Associate Professor of Religion at Lehigh University. ● *Stanley Romaine Hopper* is Professor of Christian Ethics at Drew Theological Seminary. ● *Bernard M. Loomer* is Professor of Theology and Dean of the Federated Theological Faculty at the University of Chicago. ● *Alexander Miller* is Professor in the Special Programs in Humanities at Stanford University.

Two Marginal Notes on the Prophetic View of History

A. Roy Eckardt

The prophetic preachment, rather "popular" in our recent troublous years, which affirms that historical calamity endured by one or another sinful nation is a measure of the wrath of the Lord sounds plausible enough on the surface. Our temptation is to applaud Victor Hugo's classic exposition of the Battle of Waterloo in *Les Misérables:*

> "Was it possible for Napoleon to win the battle? We answer in the negative. Why? On account of Wellington? on account of Blücher? No; on account of God. . . . Napoleon had been denounced in the infinite, and his fall was decided. He troubled God. . . . The shadow of a mighty right hand is cast over Waterloo. . . . He Who is unanswerable undertook the task."

Most Christians agree that relative moral judgments are possible respecting different nations. The point at issue is whether the ways of God can be readily comprehended within this form of understanding.

The above preachment is of reputed value in helping the prophet of 725 B.C. or 1953 A.D. both to discern—through however dark a glass—the impending, or at least apparent, fate of nations of divergent moral worth and to proclaim a word of needed repentance to his own people. The obverse of the preachment is that a nation which "returns unto the Lord" may be saved from historical catastrophe (other things being equal).

I

Upon deeper reflection certain grave questions arise concerning the validity of such historical-theological analysis, where it is unqualified by necessary reservations. At least three difficulties present themselves.

First, the preachment may induce politico-moral laxity. Many factors can bring about the death of a particular nation—including, ironically enough, its own righteous fear of selling itself to the Devil. The real tragedy is that a nation which refuses to "make friends" for itself "by means of unrighteous mammon" may, through an attempt to preserve its own moral purity, fail to fulfill its responsibilities to the world community.

A Christian who opens his Bible and reads with approval the prophetic strictures against political alliances on the part of Israel—because such alliances only turn the Lord's people away from the religious necessity of moral regeneration and reliance upon Yahweh—may at the same time shrink from the advice that the United States can "go it alone" in the world crisis of the mid-twentieth century. There is no necessary contradiction within this dual point of view. It can be held with good sense even after full allowance is made for the fact that more than twenty-five hundred years separate the Old Testament prophets from us and that ancient Israel is not contemporary America.

Such contradiction as obtains lies in the very nature of historical life. Man lives simultaneously in the two dimensions of eternity and time. To be more specific, the "sublime unconcern of the prophets for political destiny represents a point of religious transcendence where religion and politics stand in contradiction" (Reinhold Niebuhr, Introduction to *The Jew in Our Day,* by Waldo Frank, page 13).

Unless we take into account the fact that religion and politics come to a parting of the ways when an ultimate religious perspective is attained, we run the danger of providing a religious sanction for political irresponsibility toward both our own people and the peoples of the world and thereby of violating the "Love thy neighbor" commandment at the collective level. The need today for American humility and penitence cannot be overstressed. But where repentance is divorced from moral action it becomes immoral. It mocks God through mocking his creatures. The crucial point is that "fruits worthy of repentance" include not alone an attempt to improve the spiritual and moral quality of our common life. They also involve a willingness to devote national effort to the unclean but necessary business of power politics. In short, the prophetic conviction that spiritual and moral regeneration, as against "entangling alliances," is what saves a nation from destruction cannot be followed as the unilateral foundation of a political policy.

Second, the preachment that it is the anger of the Lord which brings nations to nought really tells us nothing, morally and historically speaking. This is seen when we recall the simple but stern fact that *all* nations are at some time destroyed—or at least commit suicide—whether "good," "bad," or "indifferent." The ultimate *explanation* of the collapse of *any* given nation may well be its own sinfulness (aided and abetted by the sinfulness of other nations). Human sin is the complement of the wrath of God. But the *final outcome* is the same among *all* nations. The preachment before us says no more than does that universal strophe of history, "Nations finally fall."

One of America's great preachers noted in a sermon soon after World War II began that when the Assyrians conquered Judea and the people were tempted to cry that this proved the power of the gods of Assyria, the prophets replied that what this really proved was that Judea had sinned. But did it really "prove" that? Relations between nations and between men and God are much too complicated for any event to "prove" anything. The conquest of nation *A* by nation *B* may result from the fact that nation *A* sinned much *less* than nation *B*. There is more than one ground of suffering in this world. Vicarious suffering may not be as prevalent as retributive suffering. Yet it is just as real.

It does no good to claim that an evil nation will perish before a relatively good nation. Many ruthless empires endure for centuries while some nations which overtly evidence a large degree of political and economic justice and righteousness in internal and external affairs (our only direct criterion for judging national worth) perish in their childhood. There is no simple correlation between the temporal survival of a nation and its moral and spiritual health.

The lament of the Psalmist, "We are consumed by thine anger" (90:7), is a universal cry. But this is a theological conviction which is only incidentally historical. Such *indiscriminate* confession of sin is considerably removed from the *discriminate* ethical and historical help which a distinction between the fate of "good" and "bad" nations is supposed to render.

Third, the preachment is easily allied with the spiritually reprehensible scheme which holds in black and white fashion that moral uprightness insures divine favor while the "way of the ungodly" must perish (Psalm 1:6). In truth, Christian obedience to God has no rationale other than obedience to God. The work of moral valuation may be of assistance as one seeks to obey God, but personal reward is at most a by-product. Whether the outcome of obedience be a crown or a cross is quite irrelevant.

Whatever validity the First Psalm and related Biblical passages have lies in their calling our attention to the ultimate denouement of faith versus sin. It is the truth that Jesus Christ, the righteous Servant of

the Lord, "endured the cross, despising the shame" and is therefore "seated at the right hand of the throne of God" (Hebrews 12:2). Correspondingly, in the Kingdom of God the "way of the ungodly" has already perished. To take the First Psalm literally is, on the one hand, to cause confusion in the presence of data which contradict the Psalm both historically and morally and, on the other hand, to try to employ God in blasphemous fashion as servant of our moral expectations.

Human convictions about the relative goodness of nations lose their persuasiveness in the presence of the God who knoweth the secrets of the heart," who "has consigned all men to disobedience, that he may have mercy upon all," and who raises up a saving remnant from among those whose "righteousness is as filthy rags."

The preachment we have considered is thus of relevance in pointing to the power of the Lord as he holds the fate of all nations in the palm of his hand. The message may conceivably fulfill a cathartic and homiletical function by inducing repentance. But it may be used with propriety only when the difficulties indicated are frankly admitted at the same time.

II

To turn to a second and related observation of a more general nature, the three difficulties analyzed help remind us that history cannot be used to interpret history. As men gifted with a moral sense we are called to make relative ethical judgments between men and nations and to use these valuations as a basis of moral and political action. But this is quite another matter from the attempt to rely directly upon *history* (including that part of history recorded in Scripture, where prophets warn of doom and demand repentance) as the foundation of an interpretation of how history proceeds.

The temptation to imagine that history can interpret history is so great that some of the very theologians who caution us against it do not entirely escape it themselves.

We stand in the debt of Reinhold Niebuhr for his repeated admonitions against ignoring the evident hiatus between time and eternity, history and superhistory, politics and religion. In *Faith and History*, Dr. Niebuhr points out that "the processes of historical justice are . . . not exact enough to warrant the simple confidence in the moral character of history which both secular and religious theories frequently ascribe to it" (page 129). Dr. Niebuhr is fully aware that analyses of the fate of nations and civilizations offer almost undecipherable complexities. And yet, he himself seeks to show that the Christian paradox of life through death and death through life can be partially validated through analysis of the collective life of mankind.

> "The death and famine in the life of man's social institutions and cultures is . . . never so much the fruit of a natural mortality as the consequence of a vain delusion which seeks to hide the contingency and mortality of every power and majesty in human history.
>
> But there is fortunately another possibility in history. The powers and majesties, the institutions and structures of human contrivance do not always meet the challenge of competitive forces by increased rigidity and idolatry. Sometimes the competitive challenge serves to moderate the idolatrous claims. Judgment leads to repentance. There is not as clearly defined an experience of repentance in the life of communities and social institutions as in that of individuals. Yet there is a possibility that old forms and structures of life may be renewed, rather than destroyed by the vicissitudes of history. These experiences establish the validity of the Christian doctrine of life through death for the collective, as well as for the individual, organism" (page 226).

In truth, when one looks to an event or trend in history as a means of validating

faith, it is not the history as such that offers real support. Or if one element in history seems to provide support, another immediately does the opposite. The work of "validation" is always a matter of personal interpretation through the eyes of faith. If faith precedes the analysis of history, history cannot validate faith. We cannot have it both ways. An atheist will refuse to see a manifestation of the Christian life-death paradox in historical events, or if he does admit some sort of paradox he will explain it in purely naturalistic terms. He certainly will never grant that historical events can disclose a judgment of God. This refusal need not be perverse or stupid. The atheist simply approaches history with opposite presuppositions from those of the Christian. *On the basis of historical analysis alone,* he is just as correct as the Christian.

As astute an analyst of history as Roger L. Shinn gets into the same difficulty as does Reinhold Niebuhr in his recent remarkable study, *Christianity and the Problem of History*. With Dr. Niebuhr, Shinn knows very well the absurdity of trying to discern a simple pattern in the course of history. He emphasizes that "the sovereignty of God is not obvious in history" and that "the Christian doctrine of providence in its deeper forms cannot be primarily a theory of historical causation" (pages 247, 250).

On the other hand, Dr. Shinn believes we can detect certain limited evidences within the "cumulative process" of history for an affirmation of divine providence. To give two illustrations, Shinn refers with evident approval to Herbert Butterfield's observation that providential judgment is manifested in the way that history breaks the power of lopsided ambition. He sees further support in Reinhold Niebuhr's contention that divine grace is shown in the chance a society has to repent of its sins (pages 257, 258).

Are we not also required to point simultaneously to the facts that unambitious men go down and that relatively "good" societies tend to see little reason for repenting? The point is that the choice of certain historical eventualities as supporting data for a doctrine of providence without equal attention to contrary historical possibilities is an arbitrary choice. Without allusion to these other possibilities, any universal application of one's theory of providence is precluded. Yet as soon as the other possibilities are brought under discussion, the original claim that particular aspects of history sustain a conviction of the operation of divine providence loses its force.

Dr. Shinn criticizes Karl Löwith's *Meaning in History* for denying the "meaning of history" while trying to assert the "meaning of life in history." This surrender of the meaning of history, it is alleged by Shinn, is a departure from Biblical faith (page 252).

Why is it not just as Christian to affirm that, while there is a divinely supported meaning to the specific events of history, we simply do not know what that meaning is? Or better, while we are assured by the light of the Gospel that God's purpose is to reconcile to himself men who live in history, we do not really know what the relation is between the course of history and our redemption. Dr. Shinn is quite aware that the only way we can apprehend meaning in history is through the eyes of faith. But he does not recognize that the transcendent perspective of faith in the God whose thoughts and ways are not ours discloses the impossibility of any and every interpretation of how and why history moves as it does. Faith is primarily *pistis* rather than intellectual *gnosis*.

We must agree and disagree with Karl Löwith. He is right that the pattern of history is inscrutable. But, in a way reminiscent of Marcion, Löwith also denies from the standpoint of Christian faith the Old Testament emphasis upon God as sovereign over world history. He says frankly that "Christians are not a historical people" (*Meaning in History*, page 195). Now, the

first conviction of Löwith does not necessitate the second. The cause of a good deal of confusion in Christian interpretations of history is a failure to distinguish the question of whether there is a discernible "pattern" of history from the fact of the hidden control which God *in Christ* exercises over all history. Once this confusion obtains, Shinn and Niebuhr can legitimately criticize Löwith for seeing no meaning in history and Löwith can legitimately criticize Shinn and Niebuhr for imagining that history partially discloses its Christian meaning.

The Christian interpretation of history naturally implies and needs a *theology* of history. But it cannot rely on the *facts* (events and trends) of history. As soon as it does the latter, the door is opened for the subordinating of faith to history, with the accompanying difficulties we discussed in the first part of this article. In the first instance, religion is confused with politics. In the second, the continuing and absolute judgment of God is confused with the historical fate of particular nations. In the third, the eschatological state of the blessed and the condemned is confused with this-worldly rewards and punishments.

The prophetic preachment we have analyzed together with various other attempts to rely on history in order to explain history come down to a rationalism which is quite different from faith. With all their Christian emphases, these attempts represent a *philosophy* of history instead of a theology of history. Unfortunately, philosophies of history finally run up against historical facts which upset a rational scheme and ethical and religious obligatons which not only disappoint moralistic expectations but require such "faith, hope and love" as put history to shame while at the same time they redeem it.

About the Fall Conference

On page 31 of this issue you will find an announcement of the annual conference of Christian Action, the organization which publishes this journal.

This year's conference has been conceived of as a study conference devoted to consolidating our membership and to strengthening our work through further development of our common convictions, through deepening the participation of our members, and through corporate worship.

The conference will feature the work of three commissions of the Resource and Emphasis Committee: on American Foreign Policy; on the Minister, the Parish, and the Community; and on Freedom and Order in Democratic Society. Principal speakers at the Conference will be Dr. John C. Bennett and Dr. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.

Make your reservation now by returning the coupon on page 30. Cost of the Conference is $10.00 for meals and lodging plus $5.00 for a travel pool.

A British Comment on a British Occasion

Delayed Reflections on the Coronation

Alexander Miller

It was not until I came to New York for the summer that I saw and heard the Coronation Service. At the time when it blanked everything else on TV and radio, I was pursuing my godly course of lecturing on Religion in Higher Education or some such thing, and I had to take the word of American friends and exiled British that the service looked and sounded at least as well as it read.

I had attended on Coronation Eve, in a small Californian town, an extraordinary service in which not only the exiled British and those of British extraction, but a vast crowd of 100 per cent Americans packed the Church to pray in all faith and friendliness for the young Queen and for the true prosperity of her realm. It was a moving and mysterious thing to think how many thousands of times those prayers were multiplied "from sea to shining sea."

But I had not actually measured the impact of the service itself until I saw in New York that amazing Rank film, *A Queen is Crowned.* And here again the crowds: queues day after day wound round the block; Hebrew-Americans, German-Americans, Chinese-Americans, Roman priests and Protestant pastors. For what? For the color, maybe, which is out of this world . . . or for the horses, which are worth the price of admission alone . . . or for the skirl of pipes and the lift of drums and trumpets? For Olivier laying the patina of Shakespeare's verse on the heart-stopping scenes of Britain's lakes and Britain's lanes? Maybe, but more likely not.

I gather that the general comment ran: But how religious it was! And so, indeed, it was. There are anomalies and some abuses in the church-state relation in England. But I do not doubt that it came as an illumination to many, who assume that Establishment means subservience, to discover how completely, in this symbolic instance, the Church was the master of the situation. And this in spite of the fact that the Establishment now holds in vital membership only a fraction of the population. What in fact is represented here is the long and authentic tradition of England, which is symbolically honored and residually powerful. As for the Church of Scotland, which was for the first time visibly participant in the service: that Church was at ease with itself and with the monarch, and able to observe the Church of England wrestle for a true re-statement of its relation to the State, since at Elizabeth's very accession, and long before her Coronation, she had, as by law and necessity bound, pledged to defend the liberty of the Scottish church.

There are some great liturgical moments apart even from the greatest of them all, the Anointing ("so old that history cannot reach it") and the Communion. There is the initial and exultant "I was glad when they said unto me. . . ." There is the presentation of the Book:

> "The most valuable thing this world affords. Here is wisdom; this is the royal law; these are the lively oracles of God."

Of course there are ambiguities, even scandals, and maybe in retrospect this is the time to mark them for removal. The peerage which filled the stage is a relic and in part degenerate, though it has the remnant marks of breeding. The colonial rulers, though there are among them both good and great, stamped the service both with universality and partiality, for they rule in part only under law. Great tracts of authentic British life were simply not

there, though they were not alien. Labor, for example, was dragged into the film as an afterthought by some fleeting shots of symbolic toiling figures on the Victoria Monument.

Yet it is as with the Church: the abuses have their rebuke and their corrective in the tradition. If meaningless distinctions of class are to be challenged, they can be challenged from here. If colonial abuses are to be righted, the charter is here, in the great Service itself. If labor's status is still to be settled, it had best be settled here in the subjection of all to the Monarch, and of the Monarch to God and the Law.

Subjection to God and the Law! What a battering the young Queen takes. She is stripped to her mere humanity, and girded again with power and with pomp only on the most rigorous terms. She is minded of Christ's kingship, of the rights of the people and the Church. The power so sparingly dealt her is held under God and at the will of Parliament and people. She holds it while her will is their will, which means that in fact she does not hold it at all, but represents it as it passes from hand to hand of her successive ministers.

Here are focused all the problems of power. So precarious it was in the hands of kings that in all the Christian West we have either abolished the kings or abolished the power. Britain chooses to keep the kings, having abolished their power; and then to fix in the Coronation rite the paradox of power, that it can be safely held and safely wielded only by the subject man, the man at one with men—and therefore in fact by no man save One, the Redeemer who learned obedience and won His crown rights by the things that He suffered, whose Cross surmounts the Orb.

. . . . . .

So much for the ritual meaning of the thing. But so rich and suggestive is the service that it sets the mind moving in every human direction, some most curious and unallowed-for.

There is one extraordinary shot in the film: when the girl Elizabeth comes into the Abbey to the sound of a Psalm, the people bowing on every side, through the arch of the nave there is a glimpse of King Edward's Chair, severe, alone and waiting, to be the place of her ordeal of subjection and exaltation. And there came unbidden to the mind another chair, only recently in the press, the electric chair in the death-house at Sing Sing, severe also and alone, where Ethel Rosenberg came after her husband and between two guards.

Two different women and two very different chairs—so distant each from the other that there seems no bond, no bond at all. And yet how close in fact they are, separated by little more than accident of birth and quirk of circumstance. It is not that justice was not done, as men count justice, in one case as in the other. And yet, this conjunction in the mind is a reminder of how provisionally men can count justice. For it is not hard to believe that each came to her place—of honor and of dishonor—by faithfulness after her fashion.

"Give the king thy judgments, O God,
And they righteousness unto the king's son."

But there is one gift that is not for the king, nor for the king's son, nor for any of the sons of men—the right of final approbation or of final reprobation.



The Planned Parenthood Episode in the New York Welfare and Health Council

Notes prepared by the Church-State group of the New York Chapter of Christian Action

When for reasons which included reasons of economy it was agreed last year that organizations federated in a Welfare Council and those federated in a Health Council should unite in a Welfare and Health Council, one condition was that organizations formerly members of the Health Council must apply to the Board of the Welfare and Health Council for admission to the newly merged Council. One organization that was in this manner required to qualify a second time for being federated was Mothers' Health Clinics, which includes a Planned Parenthood Committee.

Its principles, procedures, etc., were approved by the Board of the Welfare and Health Council. But the President of the Welfare and Health Council, a Protestant, interrogated the Roman Catholic agencies, more than fifty in the new Council, as to what would be their course of action if the Planned Parenthood body should be admitted. The necessity of this interpellation might be questioned in view of the fact that some Roman Catholic agencies had been in the Health Council when the Planned Parenthood body had been a member there, and had not withdrawn. Regardless of that fact, questions arise as to the propriety of such an interpellation since the Board itself found no reason to deny the application, and since, if the question were raised officially and explicitly, one could not be overwhelmed with surprise at the answer which was in fact given; namely, that if Planned Parenthood should be admitted, Roman Catholic agencies must in conscience withdraw.

The Board refused admission then, after having approved the organization in principle. Dr. I. Ogden Woodruff, Vice-President of the Board, resigned in protest. Protests followed from individuals, from other agencies in the Council, from Protestant and Jewish bodies, and from non-sectarian associations.

Plans of the dissident agencies were coordinated in an *ad hoc* group, and a protest slate was presented at the eleventh hour for the Spring 1953 Board elections. Somewhat surprisingly, the protest slate was elected. The application of the Planned Parenthood group was called up for reconsideration, and accepted, to take effect July 1, 1953. The Roman Catholic agencies announced that they would withdraw when the Planned Parenthood group's membership would become effective. The executive secretary of the Welfare and Health Council, a Roman Catholic, resigned. The successful campaign for a change in the Board membership was waged principally on behalf of *a soundly democratic procedure—not against Roman Catholic agencies nor for Planned Parenthood.*

The issue is not just a local one. There are in some states, state laws against the dissemination of contraceptive information and advice, passed decades ago and at that time supported by puritan sentiment, but now kept on the books by a robust Roman Catholic defense. There is a history of Roman Catholic withdrawal from at least one state group, based on conscientious refusal to cooperate with a federation that includes a Planned Parenthood group. Pressures of a similar sort are felt or expected at widely separated points.

Roman Catholic statements have included an answer to the charge that they are inconsistent—now cooperating, now re-

fusing cooperation: they must weigh in each situation the probable moral gains and losses on each alternative.

No statements have come to our attention in which Roman Catholic spokesmen credit those who oppose them in this matter with convictions supported by their religious faith; they do express their respect for the social conscience of their opponents. Protestants will welcome the publication, within a few months, of a careful and forthright statement by Dean Pike (the manuscript of which some of us have seen) which relates effectively the social and the religious conscience of a large section of Protestantism, in the consideration of birth control.

A fear entertained by many Protestants is that Roman Catholic intransigeance in such situations as the one under discussion may, when it prevails, forge an important link in a chain of social domination. There may be no precise parallel to the birth control issue; the apprehension would still be felt. The intention to forge instruments of social domination by a religious minority need not be an official one: there need be no "conspiracy"; a small group seeking particular ends may still take advantage of the inflexible faith of fellow-religionists, and the apprehension of the opposing but composite majority would be just as lively and just as well founded. Protestants may well ask, of themselves and others, where the boundary falls between living up to one's own conscience, and trying, directly or indirectly, to make it the effective criterion for the community. Put differently, there is a problem of the proper coordination of the religious conscience and the social conscience when they seem to conflict.

Protestants, who are inclined to be fearful and inactive in situations which will prove hurtful to them unless they actively resist actions supported by Roman Catholic organizations, may take courage from the New York episode: resistance firmly grounded in social and religious conviction may be rendered effective without bigotry and without animus, and with no denial of the rights or conscience of a minority. If on such a basis mutual respect is firmly established, the climate would not be unfavorable to the evolution of the best possible community cooperation.

The Facts about the Fringes of American Protestantism . . .

APOSTLES OF DISCORD by Ralph L. Roy

Here is a thoroughly documented, vigorous study of extremist forces that are endeavoring to capture the Protestant mind. Its theses are:

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REVIEWS

Our Heritage

Christian Faith and Social Action, edited by John A. Hutchison. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953.

Here is a book which is concerned to set forth the relevance of Christian faith to the society in which we live. It consists of thirteen essays of unusually high caliber. Most of the contributors including our honorary as well as our active chairmen have been active in the formation of Christian Action. This is a book which we not only should regard as canonical, but which we should read.

The volume would, of course, commend itself solely on the basis of its penetrating theological insights. Nevertheless, there are also some particular reasons why we should welcome its appearance. In the first place, it will be noted that this symposium represents a consensus of opinion which is unusual, given the large number of contributors. The authors themselves acknowledge that much of their agreement on central issues is to be attributed to the fact that they have all, in one way or another, been indebted to the thinking of Reinhold Niebuhr. They have chosen to express their gratitude by dedicating this book to him. Incidentally, it should be mentioned that Professor Niebuhr's own essay was written without the knowledge that the essays were to be dedicated to him. In the second place, we in Christian Action should hail the publication of this volume because it represents a conscious attempt to articulate the concerns of a group which shared in the parentage of our own organization. It speaks for a group which was founded in 1930, as the Fellowship of Socialist Christians and which in 1947, changed its name to the Frontier Fellowship. In the initial essay John Hutchison, the editor to whose labors we are so largely indebted for this book, tells something of the story of this Fellowship. He also suggests some of the central concerns which were shared by its members and which are manifest in the essays in this volume. In 1951, the Frontier Fellowship voluntarily dissolved its independent existence in order to merge itself into the larger life of Christian Action. This book stands as a reminder to us that we are heirs of a tradition of profound theological analysis and bold social criticism. It also reminds us that we must not allow the pressures and demands of our larger organizational life to stifle this kind of creative and pioneering thought.

Now let us turn to some observations about the content of the book. The reader will soon find that this book seldom isolates areas of social action from their theological context. Rather, the writers seek to work out a Christian interpretation of the world in which man finds himself in the hope that if man understands his situation in history he can then act to better purpose within it. They seek to set forth the relevance and validity of Christian faith by contrasting it with the significant alternative interpretations which compete for men's allegiance today, and they seek to show that "Christian categories are more adequate for thought and action than are the competing categories of . . . other faiths and faith substitutes" (p. 3). In the final chapter of the book, Professor Niebuhr lists some of the alternative positions which from the standpoint of this book are seen as false or misleading.

1) Niebuhr speaks first of all of the necessity of refuting that form of Protestant individualism, "according to which there is no obligation or necessity to change the social and political structures in the interest of a higher justice" (p. 225). This presupposition that the redemption of the individual cannot take place in isolation from the redemption of his community seems to be shared by the various writers. Paul Tillich deals directly with the problem in his important essay "The Person in a Tech-

nical Society." He indicates that one of the major tasks of Christian action is to show "how the competitive society produces patterns of existence which destroy personality because they destroy community" (p. 152). Alexander Miller, in dealing with a related area, seeks to define the meaning of Christian vocation in an industrial society. It involves, he says, "not simply the decision of the man who has . . . a particular job choice to make, but the decision of all Christian men and men of goodwill about the type of social and economic order they want to live in" (pp. 135–6).

2) A second position which our writers subject to searching criticism is that "vague Christian or secular moralism" which stresses the idea of "the progressive perfectability of man." In opposition to all such liberal, humanistic utopianism, the members of the Fellowship repeatedly stress the Christian doctrine of original sin. In terms of social theory this is seen to imply "the inevitability of tensions and conflicts in human affairs" (p. 226). Reinhold Niebuhr is, of course, at his best in dealing with this characteristic theme. With extraordinary skill, he shows how self-interest has insinuated itself not only into the Bourgeois liberalism of *laissez-faire* economics, but also into the utopian idealism of Marxist collectivism. This same theme is admirably implemented by other essays in the book. Vernon Holloway in a searching analysis of "Christian" approaches to foreign policy shows how both liberal and pacifistic Protestants have repeatedly contributed to a confused understanding of the international situation by creating and sustaining utopian expectations of international peace and community. There has been too little awareness, he says, "that political action by its very nature presupposes the strife of competing interests, the conflict of nations, and the need for the balancing and ordering of power if peace with justice is in some measure to be attained" (p. 190). In this same connection, Liston Pope offers a rather wholesome reminder that our insight into the perennial sinfulness of man must not obscure the fact that many specific social evils can be dealt with and eliminated. He shows that there are "adequate grounds for the belief that particular social problems can be solved". . . . "To lose heart about an immediate problem is defeatist." Nevertheless, he adds, "to suppose that it will have no successor is fatuous" (pp. 223–4).

This book not only exposes the complacent man-centeredness which is so often cloaked in a theological guise, but it also directs its criticism against the wide-spread idolatory of secular humanism. Both Charles Kean and Will Herberg address themselves to the problem created for our culture by the humanistic reliance on man's intellectual capacities and technological skills. Kean shows how man's trust in his own capacities to manipulate social forces has been shown to be inadequate by the anxieties and confusions of our time. Herberg, borrowing useful terminology from Tillich, indicates the essentially idolatrous character of man's "autonomous" trust in his own intelligence and makes an eloquent plea for an interpretation of life and particularly of science in terms of a "theonomous" dimension.

3) The third position to be subjected to thoroughgoing criticism is Communism. This book contains a wealth of valuable insight into the nature of this movement. A full-dress survey of the issues between Christians and Communists is set forth in the essay by John Bennett entitled "The Church Between East and West." This chapter is noteworthy for its lucid and precise analyisis of the empirical situation and is remarkably free of ideological elements. The aspect of Communism which comes under heaviest criticim in this volume is its totalitarian character. "Communism with its base in the Soviet Union creates a vast totalitarian empire and threatens the political and the spiritual and cultural freedom of other nations." "It is this fact," says Bennett, "that makes political resistance to Communism urgent" (p. 78). Eduard Heimann has contributed an article on "Christian Liberty and Totalitarianism." In it he subjects Russian ideas of freedom

as well as some Western ones to a very searching analysis. In this same vein, Professor Tillich in a memorable phrase says that the tragic fate of Marxism in our day is that "A movement which started with a passionate fight against depersonalization has turned into one of the greatest powers of depersonalization in all history" (p. 141).

Another aspect of Communism which is sharply criticized is its utopian charcter. Although this is mentioned in many places, it is treated most directly in Roger Shinn's extremely well written chapter on "The Christian Gospel and History." He critically analyzes the falsely utopian character of the Marxist hopes for a change in the very nature of human motivation which is to follow the revolution and the temporary dictatorship of the proletariat. Not only does Shinn show how little support these hopes have received from contemporary history, he also shows with great clarity the dangers and theological errors which are inherent in utopianism as such (pp. 31, 32).

I cannot conclude this review without noting that there seems to me to be a significant emphasis in this present volume which has not characterized the thinking of the Frontier Fellowship in the past. I discern in this new volume some very significant thinking about the nature of the Church and about its role in our world. There is, of course, the familiar and characteristic recognition that the empirical church as a human institution stands very much under the divine judgment. One is made acutely aware of the tragic failure of the church to separate itself and its message from the interests of the controlling groups in industrial society. Again and again it is asserted that Christians must humbly accept God's judgment upon their own corporate life just as much as they must accept His judgment on the total culture of our times.

This kind of reminder to the churches is very much needed, and it is one which the Fellowship has been offering for two decades. What is new, however, in this volume is the emphasis on the character of the Church as "in but not of the world." This fellowship of the Church, frail and human and sinful as it is, is nevertheless seen as the bearer of a new reality. This reality not only stands over against man's pretensions, it is also destined in God's own time to bring about the transformation of our human existence and the ultimate reunion with the God who is the source and ground of existence. In this volume, the categories in terms of which our contemporary struggle is interpreted are no longer those of mere socialism as opposed to mere capitalism. Rather, we find the struggle defined in terms of more theological categories. On the one hand, there is the new reality which is manifest in the life of the Church. This God-given structure of grace is seen as standing over against "every social pattern and structure which seeks to preserve and justify itself by the idolatry of the *status quo*" (Lehmann, p. 110) on the other hand. The concrete, factual, indicative character of this new reality as proclaimed by the church and partially set forth in its life is carefully analyzed in two difficult but rewarding essays. One by Clifford Stanley explores the full nature of the Church. The other by Paul Lehmann develops the implications of what he calls a *koinonia* ethic which starts from the concrete actuality of the Church and thinks about ethics from this basis. This reviewer is of the opinion that the latter two writers are doing a signal service in spelling out in specific detail what Tillich seems to be driving at in his more amorphous and general terminology when he speaks of "the New Reality which is manifest in Christ and against which even technical society and its power of destroying the person as person cannot prevail" (p. 153). This Reality transcends all given social structures, yet it is the ground on which and from which all attacks on existing institutions must be based, including the attack on Christianity itself.

Stephen T. Crary

A Study in Literature

Rehearsals of Discomposure. Alienation and Reconciliation in Modern Literature: Franz Kafka, Ignazio Silone, D. H. Lawrence, T. S. Eliot; by Nathan A. Scott, Jr., King's Crown Press, Columbia University, New York, 1952.

This will prove both an interesting and challenging book to all those who have earned the right to recognize the deep relation which exists between the spiritual quest and the literary witness of our time. It is written with boldness and competence. It is a literate book—in the sense that it is written out of that matrix of theological writing and literary criticism which is at once the most prophetic and sensitive recognition of the present ordeal of the spirit. Its theme is clear cut—the problem of isolation, estrangement, and alienation, as experienced by modern man: and which the author proposes to assess at three levels —at the level of our sense of cosmic exile, at the level of our sense of the loss of community with others, and at the level of man's "ontological solitude," "What might be called the structural discontinuities between persons, which are the result of man's finitude." To this end he studies the works of four men—Franz Kafka, Ignazio Silone, D. H. Lawrence and T. S. Eliot—in order to exhibit and explore the terms of alienation.

The four studies are excellent. The author allows himself sufficient amplitude, both rhetorically and structurally, to orient his special approach within the relevant critical work already done—a necessary gambit, for one of the tests of an author in this *genre* is the skill with which he deploys established perspectives in order to let a fresh appraisal emerge. The reader is then supplied with sufficient biographical data to lay hold upon the person in his setting together with the factors conditioning his particular experience of estrangement. The chief works are then examined with a view to revealing the configuration of this inner cleft at its point of deepest implication.

It would seem to this reviewer that the studies of Lawrence and Silone are the most successful, and those of Kafka and Eliot the least so. This is not due in this instance to the frequent fact that the devil (Lawrence) is unconsciously more attractive to the author than the saint (Eliot), but rather to the fact that Scott is at his best in narrative reconstruction where his own style moves with ease and sharpness. This is true almost equally when reproducing other men's ideas, as in the brilliant rehearsal of de Rougemont's thesis (from *Love in the Western World*) which is employed so adroitly in establishing the tradition of love to which he would assimilate the sex mysticism of Lawrence. This is one of the finest parts of the book, and, though de Rougemont's thesis is perhaps coerced to a degree, the use made of it points to a high degree of critical perspicacity on the part of the author. Any excess at this point is offset by the comparison with Whitman which, though brief, confirms the concealed death-wish latent in the type of love sponsored by Lawrence.

Theologically and psychologically the author does not move with the same adequacy. An estrangement of psychological origin passes too easily into "ultimate isolation." The preference for T. S. Eliot's later work as presenting "the most complete strategy of reconciliation in recent literature" has much to commend it, but the theological amalgam of Tillich, Niebuhr, Kierkegaard, Eliot and Maritain, which the author appears to hold, does not permit the structural nature of this strategy to come through decisively. For this reason, the reader may feel oppressed at times, where the author is overborne by his authorities, or where a certain existential identification in pathos is wanting at the point of live participation in the patterns of suffering so eloquently portrayed. But synthesis at this high level is hard to come by, and the book amply justifies itself as a work rightly aimed, often brilliant, and richly deserving to be read by those who know the virtue of "these limbic saints."

Stanley Romaine Hopper

Unsaintly Ministries

Apostles of Discord, by Ralph L. Roy. Beacon Press, Boston; 1953.

Ralph Roy in this book describes the many movements on the fringes of Protestantism which are related to the extreme right and the extreme left. Most of the book deals with the movements which in the name of Christianity exploit the fears and hatreds of people. They include such movements as Carl McIntire's American Council of Churches, which is in this company comparatively literate and discriminating, and Gerald L. K. Smith's form of American Fascism. These movements combine religious bigotry with social reaction and a fanatical Americanism. They have in common a tendency to find Communism everywhere, not least in the National Council of Churches and in the seminaries. Mr. Roy wrote a very extensive thesis for the M.A. at Columbia University and Union Seminary on these rightest groups. He proved to have amazing gifts for this type of research and investigation. He has always gone out of his way to be fair to the groups about which he writes.

This book includes two kinds of organizations which are very different from the reactionary movements which specialize in hatred and false polemics. One type consists of the more moderate and urbane representatives of extreme social conservatism such as Spiritual Mobilization and the Christian Freedom Foundation (Christian Economics), and the other is made up of the movements which have brought American Protestants in touch with Communism. There is one other movement, led by several of our most respected Protestant leaders, that hardly fits any classification: Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State. This was discussed to indicate how it sometimes resembles and sometimes differs from the fanatical anti-Catholic groups.

There is one great difficulty which emerges when all of these movements are discussed in one volume, especially a volume with this title. Many churchmen have had some connection with both these moderately conservative and these leftist movements which do not fit the title at all. We may say that the members of the hard Stalinist core in some of these leftist movements deserve to be classed with extremists on the other side, but most of the Protestants who have belonged to their organizations never realized how they were being used. I should go so far as to say that even some of those who belong to what I call "the hard Stalinist core" became involved originally in their Communist-front activities when they were more defensible than they are now and that they never allowed themselves to recognize the real nature of the Soviet Union and its power.

There are two journals mentioned in this book which are vulnerable in their editorial tendency to be uncritical of the Soviet Union, but which have the support of many churchmen because of other things for which they stand. A writer on this subject who failed to mention the problem created by the political orientaton of these journals would probably be wrong, and yet it will strike most readers as absurd to connect them with the title of this book. There are individuals discussed in the book whom I have omitted, but Mr. Roy has written about them with every attempt to be fair and discriminating. They will quite naturally resent being discussed at all under this title.

Mr. Roy has produced a book which should prove to be a useful guide to all the social and political movements on the fringe of Protestantism. Despite the dangers of erroneous inferences of guilt by association due to possible failure to recognize the mixed nature of the company considered under a title which fits only about two-thirds of the book, the book as a whole is competent and discriminating, and the author has tried to avoid the unfair polemics which he describes so fully in his book.

John C. Bennett

Roots of Social Action

The Bible and Our Common Life, by Huber F. Klemme; Christian Education Press, Philadephia, 1953.

The author of this new little book is certainly not unknown to the members of Christian Action. He has long been associated with our fellowship and has helped to guide our work through faithful service as a member of our Executive Council. All of us may be grateful for the significant job he has been doing as social action secretary for the Evangelical and Reformed Church and as editor of *Christian Community.*

Mr. Klemme's experience and concerns qualify him well for a discussion of the relation of the insights of the Biblical testimony to the needs and problems of our common life. He has organized this treatment topically—dealing with such areas of concern as the family, the individual and the community, rights and responsibilities, property, justice, politics, race, and international affairs. In each area he considers the relevant Biblical emphases and, in the light of a discussion of the significance of these insights for their own historical situation, suggests the kind of guidance we may glean from them for our times. This Mr. Klemme does clearly and fairly, avoiding the easy temptation to let his political biases determine his choice and interpretation of Biblical material. His work is well documented with Biblical references and pertinent problems of our common life.

In his preface, Mr. Klemme asserts:

"The relation of our faith to social ethics has challenged many of the outstanding leaders of Christian thought. It still remains to bring the results of their labor to men and women in the pews, to the laymen's fellowship and the women's guild, to adult study classes, and to young people thrust into a world in which decisions are too easily made without any apparent relation to divine nature and purpose."

This discloses the task which Mr. Klemme has set before himself. His book is a real contribution in the direction of filling the need which he sees. He has succeeded in summarizing some of the best currents in present-day religious, social-ethical discussions. His book should serve not only to show the Biblical concern for our common life, but also to deepen the spiritual resources of those who are already interested in social action.

The need which Mr. Klemme sees and helps to fulfill reminds us of at least two other needs, in this area of the translation and condensation of the work of experts and specialists, which should receive more attention. One is for a systematic discussion of the relation of theology as such to social ethics. The other is for a treatment of the kind of social analysis and technical understanding of the social means to social ends which is required of us who feel called to witness responsibly to the social dimensions of the Gospel in a complex, modern, industrial society.

Robert A. Gessert

Campus Religion

Campus Gods on Trial, by Chad Walsh; Macmillan Co., New York, 1953.

Mr. Walsh has produced an apologetic (in the best sense of that word) for the Christian faith directed toward college students who find themselves in a campus milieu which generally gives at best only a pleasant and superficial nod to religion as such, but in actuality, religiously worships a multiplicity of pseudo gods.

As the title of this volume suggests, it is part of Mr. Walsh's intention to set these idolatrous gods on trial and show that by comparison to Christianity the "religions" which they spawn are indeed thin and even intellectually indefensible. Roughly, the "gods", or better the "religions", which he examines are Progressism, Relativism, Scientism, Humanitarianism, Materialism, and their ilk. Actually the book is misnamed, for Mr. Walsh spends more time

and profundity in defense of Christianity than in the trial of the false gods. It is true that in defending Christianity he deals with the stumbling blocks set up by the multi-religious atmosphere of the campus. But his treatment turns out to be more a plea for the reasonableness and endurability of Christianity than an incisive criticism of the idolatry and ideology (in the worst sense) involved in adorning some otherwise important human insights, emotions, and skills with the sanctity of religious objects of worship.

Mr. Walsh is undoubtedly well acquainted with university students, and he documents his points extensively with quotations from them. This criticism may therefore seem presumptuous. One cannot help wondering, however, if he has not taken his students' articulated reservations about Christianity a little too seriously. It is doubtful if he has struck at the deepest roots of confusion and unbelief in the minds of the more sophisticated students. One feels also that some of his parables and his "two-story" world-view have a tendency at times to get in the way more than to help his cause.

On the whole, Mr. Walsh, who is an English professor at Beloit college, has read his theologians well. In particular, he displays his appreciation of C. S. Lewis whom he has elsewhere characterized as an "apostle to the skeptics" (cf. his earlier volume, *Literary Criticism*). Mr. Walsh has proved himself a good apostle to those who are willing to admit at least that "I will hear you further on this matter." Though one may be slightly disappointed that he has not done quite the job his enticing title suggests, his book deserves a hearty welcome and praise as another voice crying in the religious wilderness of the modern university. He has given a good plea for a fair hearing for Christianity on the campus.

While the book does lack something in organization, Mr. Walsh's vivid and often exciting style help to make his work enjoyable reading as well as quite worthwhile.

Robert A. Gessert

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6:00 P.M.	Dinner
7:30 P.M.	Study Session on American Foreign Policy
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

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